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Abstract
This paper explores the relationship between residential proximity of individuals
from the same ethnic group and the probability of ﬁnding a job through social networks,
relative to other search methods. Using individual-level data from the UK Labour Force
survey and spatial statistics techniques, we ﬁnd that (i) the higher is the percentage of a
given ethnic group living nearby, the higher is the probability of ﬁnding a job through
social contacts; (ii) this eﬀect decays very rapidly with distance. The magnitude,
statistical signiﬁcance and spatial decay of such an eﬀect diﬀer depending on the ethnic
group considered. We provide an interpretation of our ﬁndings using the network model
of Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004).
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11 Introduction
Networks of personal contacts mediate employment opportunities, which ﬂow through word-
of-mouth and, in many cases, constitute a valid alternative source of employment information
to more formal methods. Such methods have the advantage that they are relatively less
costly and may provide more reliable information about jobs compared to other methods.
The empirical evidence reveals that around 50 percent of individuals obtain or hear about
jobs through friends and family (Granovetter, 1974; Corcoran et al., 1980; Holzer, 1988;
Montgomery, 1991; Gregg and Wadsworth, 1996; Addison and Portugal, 2001; Ioannides
and Loury, 2004; Wahba and Zenou, 2005; Goel and Lang, 2009; Ioannides and Topa, 2010;
Pellizzari, M., 2010; Topa, 2011). The recent study by Bayer et al. (2008) documents that
people who live close to each other, that is, in the same census block, are more likely to work
together than those in nearby blocks. Do these (positive) eﬀects extend to ethnic groups in
the labor market?
Because usually ethnic minorities experience higher unemployment rates, one may think
that ethnic enclaves may be harmful to labor-market outcomes of minorities. Indeed, having
fewer connections to employed workers makes it more diﬃcult to receiving information about
jobs and therefore reduces the chance of obtaining a job (see, e.g., Hellerstein et al. 2008).
On the other hand, the hiring of new workers via employee referral is supposed to be
important for understanding ethnic divisions of labor because it creates a built-in bias toward
incumbents: members of a particular ethnic group concentrate in speciﬁc jobs and when new
employment opportunities become available at their workplace, they pass this information
along to social contacts, often of the same race and ethnic background.
For the US, some evidence can be found in Conley and Topa (2002). They examine
the spatial distribution of unemployment in Chicago using diﬀerent social and economic
distance metrics. Their results indicate a clear dominance of the racial/ethnic distance
metric and of the racial/ethnic composition variables in explaining the spatial correlation
of unemployment. More direct evidence can be found in Falcon (2007) and Falcon and
Melendez (2001). They show that Latinos in Boston are more likely to use personal networks
to gain employment relative to other job search methods. Elliott (2001) ﬁnds that Latinos,
especially newly arrived immigrants, are more likely than native-born Whites to enter jobs
through insider referrals. He also ﬁnds that the correlation between insider referrals and
ethnically homogeneous jobs is positive and signiﬁcant only for native-born Blacks. Mouw
(2002), using longitudinal data, ﬁnds that Black workers who used personal contacts to ﬁnd
employment did no worse compared to where they used formal methods. Munshi (2003)
2attempts to identify network eﬀects among Mexican migrants in the U.S. labor market and
to test whether the network improves labor market outcomes for its members. He ﬁnds that
the same individual is more likely to be employed and to hold a higher paying nonagricultural
job when his network is exogenously larger.
There are very few papers investigating this issue for Europe. Exceptions include Frijters
et. al (2005) and Battu et al. (2011), both for the UK. They ﬁnd that, though personal
networks are a popular method of ﬁnding a job among ethnic minorities, they are not nec-
essarily the most eﬀective method in ﬁnding a job. Using data on both legal and illegal
migrants in eight Italian cities in 2009, Boeri et al. (2011) show that residential segregation
can be harmful to employment when the fraction of migrants is above 15-20% of the total
local population.
In this paper, we look at the acquisition and transmission of job information by job seekers
through their social contacts. We ﬁrst present as a theoretical background the dynamic model
of Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004) who explicitly model social networks as graphs. If
workers are linked to each other, then they exchange information about jobs. Strong ties are
direct friends while weak ties are friends of friends of any length (Granovetter, 1983; Calvó-
Armengol et al., 2007; Patacchini and Zenou, 2008). In this framework, the individual
probability of ﬁnding a job increases with the number of strong ties and weak ties. However,
the farther away is a weak tie, the lower is the individual probability of ﬁnding a job.
A precise test of this model requires detailed information on all social contacts between
individuals over time, which is unfortunately not available. However, one can use this mech-
anism and approximate the social proximity by the geographical proximity. Since ethnic
communities tend to be more socially cohesive, a reasonable conjecture is that the density
of people living in the same area is a good approximation for the number of direct friends
one has, i.e. strong ties, especially if the areas are not too large and if people belong to the
same ethnic group.1 In the same spirit, the density of individuals living in neighboring areas
will be a measure of friends of friends, i.e. weak ties. Ethnicity is thus the chosen dimension
along which agents’ social contacts develop. Using this framework, one can thus look at the
relationship between ethnic employment density and the probability of ﬁnding a job through
social contacts and use spatial data analysis techniques to investigate the spatial scale of the
eﬀects. We collect some evidence for Europe, where these issues are scarcely investigated.2
1A similar approximation of the social space (approximated by the physical space) is used in Wahba and
Zenou (2005) for the case of Egypt.
2Although immigration-related issues are now at the forefront of the political debate in Europe, detailed
data on ethnic minorities are still not available (see, e.g., Bisin et al. 2011).
3Consistently with the theoretical model, we ﬁnd that the higher is the percentage of
a given ethnic group living nearby, the higher is the probability of ﬁnding a job through
social contacts. We also ﬁnd that such an eﬀect is, however, quite localized. It decays very
rapidly with distance, losing signiﬁcance beyond approximately 60 minutes travel time. One
possible concern in our analysis is that these correlations capture the eﬀects of unobserved
characteristics of areas highly populated by ethnic minorities that also aﬀect job search
methods, such as tastes for discrimination, spatial mismatch, etc. Our qualitative results
remain unchanged if we instrument the contemporaneous level of ethnic population density
with its value lagged in time. As labor market conditions evolve over time, our assumption
is that the factors that inﬂuenced the pattern of settlement of ethnic minorities in the past
are unrelated with employment prospect today, apart from their eﬀect through present-day
ethnic population density.3
Our results can be understood within the more general existing literature on the cu-
mulative causation of immigrant inﬂows where not only employment outcomes but also
geographic origin is shared by immigrants in the same national group living in proximity.
Social scientists have indeed long noted that international migration is characterized by a
strong internal momentum: once a particular migration stream has been initiated, it tends
to persist and grow over time and often in the same location. This is referred by sociologists
to as a process of “cumulative causation” whereby social networks connecting migrants to
nonmigrants make the process of migration “self-perpetuating” (Walker and Hannan, 1989;
Massey, 1990). Massey and Espinosa (1997) have suggested that the persistence of migra-
tion in space and time stems from two fundamental processes: human and social capital
accumulation. The former operates among individuals and the latter through the social net-
works in which they are embedded. Massey and Zenteno (1999) postulate that each act of
migration creates social capital among those to whom the migrant is related. Once someone
migrates, the costs and risks of international movement fall for that person’s friends and rel-
atives, inducing some of them to migrate, which further expands the network of people with
ties to migrants, yielding more social capital, which induces new people to migrate, further
expanding the network, and so on. The steady accumulation of social capital through the
progressive expansion of interpersonal networks yields another powerful feedback loop that
results in the cumulative causation of migration over time.4
There is also an important literature in economics on the importance of networks for
outcomes such as the probability of immigration and the location decisions of recently-
3Such an approach has also been used by Rice et al. (2006).
4See Massey et al. (1998) for a review of this literature.
4arrived immigrants. For example, using the 1990 Census data, Card (2001) studies the
eﬀects of immigrant inﬂows on occupation-speciﬁc labor market outcomes. He ﬁnds that
intercity mobility rates of natives and earlier immigrants are insensitive to immigrant inﬂows.
However, occupation-speciﬁc wages and employment rates are systematically lower in cities
with higher relative supplies of workers in a given occupation. Using variation in the fraction
of immigrants across diﬀerent cities, Altonji and Card (1991) study the eﬀects of immigration
on the labor-market outcomes of the less-skilled natives. They ﬁnd that a one percentage
point increase in the share of immigrants in a city generates a one percent increase in the
supply of labor to industries in which less-skilled natives are employed. More recently,
Munshi and Wilson (2011) examine the role played by local identity, or the attachment
to a home-town, in restricting occupational choice and mobility. They ﬁnd that the eﬀect
of historical competition on participation in socializing institutions (such as churches and
parochial schools) grows stronger over the course of the twentieth century, emphasizing the
idea that small diﬀerences in initial conditions can have large long-term eﬀects on institutions
and economic choices.
Our analysis helps understand the role of local ethnic social networks on labor-market
outcomes of workers from the same ethnicity and more generally how ethnic enclaves and the
“cumulative causation” of immigrant inﬂows work in the real world. Remarkably, we ﬁnd
that these network eﬀects are very localized and work diﬀerently depending on the ethnic
group studied. For instance, we ﬁnd that the employment status of a Chinese immigrant is
strongly correlated with the size of the Chinese population living in proximity, as opposed
to the size of the Pakistani population also living in proximity, or to the size of Chinese
immigrant communities living in another town. Interestingly, no statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀects are found for Indian and Pakistani workers. As mentioned above, our analysis has,
however, some limitations, mainly because the individual social contacts (i.e. the exact social
network topologies) are not known. As a result, our analysis should be taken with caution.
Nevertheless, it presents a novel approach to this complex issue, which is able to provide
some evidence on ethnic network eﬀects and their spatial dimension in Europe.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section expose the model of Calvó-Armengol
and Jackson (2004). We clarify the link between the model and our empirical analysis in
Section 3 and describe our data in Section 4. Section 5 discusses estimation issues and
presents our empirical model and the estimation results. In Section 6, we collect additional
empirical evidence. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
52 Theoretical analysis
The aim of our theoretical framework is to understand how strong and weak ties aﬀect the
labor-market outcomes of workers. Indeed, given a network structure, we would like to see
how the size of strong and weak ties aﬀects the individual probability of obtaining a job and
thus the employment rate in the economy.
In the model, the main problem for each worker is to obtain information about jobs. Each
worker is embedded in a network of social relationships, and her direct friends are her strong
ties while the friends of her friends of any length are her weak ties. This worker can hear
about a job either directly (if by chance she sees the job advertisement) or indirectly because
one of her friends who belongs to her social network is employed, knows about this job and
transmits the information to the worker. Observe that it is assumed that the probability of
hearing directly about a job is the same for someone who is employed and for someone who
is unemployed.
2.1 Some notations and deﬁnitions from graph theory5
Denote by n the number of individuals in a given social network g, with n = U +E (U and
E are respectively the unemployment and the employment levels in the network). Therefore
N = {1,...,n} is a set of individuals connected in some network relationship. A network
is thus a list of unordered pairs of players {i,j}. These links are represented by a graph
g, where gij = 1 if i is friend with j (denoted by ij) and gij = 0 otherwise (unweighted
graphs/networks). In our framework, links are taken to be reciprocal, so that gij = gji
(undirected graphs/networks). By convention, gii = 0. The set of i’s direct contacts is:
Ni(g) = {j  = i | gij = 1}, which is of size ni(g).
One of the key features of networks/graphs is that not only direct but also indirect links
that matter.
Deﬁnition 1 A path of length k from i to j in the network g is a sequence  i0,i1,...,ik  of
players such that i0 = i, ik = j, ip  = ip+1, and gipip+1 = 1, for all 0 ≤ p ≤ k − 1, that is,
players ip and ip+1 are directly linked in g. If such a path exists, then individuals i and j are
path-connected.
In words, a path between two individuals i and j is an ordered set of agents (i,i1,...,ik,j)
of N, where an agent can appear several times, such that i  = j. We say that a path belongs
to the network g if gii1gi1i2...gikj  = 0.
5For a more complete overview of these deﬁnitions, see Wasserman and Faust (1994) and Jackson (2008).
6Deﬁnition 2 An individual i holds a strong tie with an individual j if gij = 1. An indi-
vidual i holds a weak tie with an individual j if individuals i and j are path-connected. The
length k of this (weak) tie is deﬁned by the length of the path between individuals i and j.
2.2 The model
We now described the model of Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004). Time evolves in discrete
periods indexed by t. The vector st describes the employment status of the workers at time
t. If individual i is employed at the end of period t, then sit = 1 and if i is unemployed then
sit = 0.
A period t begins with some agents being employed and others not, as described by the
vector st−1 = (s1t−1,...,snt−1) that describes the status of all workers from the last period.
Next, information about job openings arrives. In particular, any given individual hears
about a job opening with probability a that is between 0 and 1. This job arrival process is
independent across individuals. If the individual is unemployed, then she will take the job.
However, if the individual is already employed then she will pass the information along to
a friend, picked at random among her unemployed friends. As stated above, the graph or
network g summarizes the links of all agents, where gij = 1 indicates that i and j know each
other (strong tie), and share their knowledge about job information, while gij = 0 indicates
that they do not know each other.
Observe that if an employed worker hears about a job but all her friends (i.e. direct
links) are already employed, then the job is lost. We focus here on a model where wages are
exogenous and identical for all workers. So there is no room in this model for an employed
worker to exploit a job oﬀer in order to increase her current wage.
Finally, the last thing that happens in a period is that some agents lose their jobs. This
happens randomly according to an exogenous breakup rate, δ, which is between 0 and 1. We
are able to write the probability Pij of the joint event that individual i learns about a job





a if si = 0 and i = j
a/
 
k:sk=0 gik if si = 1, sj = 0, and gij = 1
0 otherwise
(1)
where the vector s describes the employment status of all the individuals at the beginning
of the period. In (1), a is the probability of obtaining a job information without using
friends and relatives. Three cases may then arise. If individuals i and j are unemployed
(si = sj = 0), then the probability that j will obtain a job is just a since individual i will
7never transmit any information to j. If individual i is already employed and her friend j
is not (si = 1, sj = 0), then individual i transmits this job information to all her direct
unemployed neighbors, who total number is
 
k:sk=0 gik. We assume that all unemployed
neighbors are treated on equal footing, meaning that the employed worker who has the job
information does not favor any of her direct neighbors. As a result, the probability that an
unemployed worker j is selected among the
 
k:sk=0 gik unemployed direct neighbors of an
employed worker j is given by: a/
 
k:sk=0 gik. Finally, if individual j is employed, then she
does not need any job information, at least in the current period.
2.3 Impact of strong ties on employment probabilities
The ﬁrst result obtained by Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004) is not surprising and has
also been showed in a static framework (see Calvó-Armengol, 2004, and Calvó-Armengol and
Zenou, 2005).
Proposition 1 The higher ni(g), the number of strong ties individual i has, the higher is
her individual probability of ﬁnding a job.
Indeed, if an individual has more strong ties, then she is more likely to hear on average
about more jobs through her friends and relatives but her chance of ﬁnding a job directly does
not increase since a is not aﬀected by the size of the network. This result is quite intuitive
since, when the number of direct connections increases, the source of information about jobs
is larger and people ﬁnd it easier to obtain a job through their friends and relatives. This is
the ﬁrst prediction of our model, which implies that workers have a greater chance of ﬁnding
a job, the higher is the number of their strong ties. Observe that the individual probability
of ﬁnding a job through strong ties for individual j is obviously not given by (1) since Pij(s)
is the probability that only one individual, i, who hold a strong tie with j, and who is aware
of some job, will transmit this information to individual j. To determine the individual
probability of obtaining a job for j, one has to do the calculation for all the direct friends of
i.
2.4 Impact of weak ties on employment probabilities
We would now like to study the impact of weak ties (as deﬁned by Deﬁnition 2) on the
individual probability of ﬁnding a job. Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004) show that, in
steady-state, there is a positive correlation in employment status between two path-connected
workers. As we will see, this result is not at all easy to obtain since, in the short run, the
8correlation is negative. Indeed, in a static model, if an employed worker is directed linked
to two unemployed workers, then if she is aware of a job, she will share this job information
with her two unemployed friends (see (1)). These two persons, who are path-connected (path
of length two) are thus in competition and one (randomly chosen) will obtain the job and
be employed while the other will stayed unemployed. So their employment statuses will be
negatively correlated (see Calvó-Armengol, 2004, and Calvó-Armengol and Zenou, 2005).
Let us now give the intuition why this negative correlation result does not hold in a
dynamic labor-market model. Consider the star-shaped network described in Figure 1 with
three individuals, i.e. n = 3 and g12 = g23 = 1. Suppose the employment status of these
three workers from the end of the last period is st−1 = (0,1,0). In the ﬁgure, a black
node represents an employed worker (individual 2), while unemployed workers (1 and 3) are
represented by white nodes. Conditional on this state st−1, the employment states s1t and
s3t are negatively correlated. As stated above, this is due to the fact that individuals 1 and




Figure 1: Employment correlations in a star-shaped network
Despite this negative (conditional) correlation in the short run, individual 1 can beneﬁt
from individual 3’s presence in the longer run. Indeed, individual 3’s presence helps improve
individual 2’s employment status. Also, when individual 3 is employed, individual 1 is more
likely to hear about any job that individual 2 hears about. These two aspects counter the
local (conditional) negative correlation, and help induce a positive correlation between the
employment status of individuals 1 and 3.
In what follows, we describe how we obtain this long-run positive correlation. Consider
again the network described in Figure 1 but without imposing any employment status to
workers. In that case, there are eight possible employment states: 000,100,010,001,110,101,
011,111, where for example 000 means that individuals 1,2, and 3 are unemployed. As a
result, the state of the economy st evolves following a Markov process M(a,δ) where a is the
job-arrival rate that takes place in the ﬁrst half of each period, while δ is the job-destruction
rate that takes place in the second half of each period. We gather the Markov transitions
into a matrix Pij = Pr{st+1 = i | st = j}, where i,j ∈ {000,100,010,001,110,101,011,111},
i.e., rows correspond to t + 1 while columns correspond to t (the columns sum up to one as
9in all Markov matrices).
As highlighted above, an important issue in this case is the short-run negative correla-
tion versus the long-run strictly positive correlation. To sort out the short and longer run
eﬀects, we divide a and δ both by some larger and larger factor, so that we are looking at
arbitrarily short time periods. We call this the “sub-division” of periods. More precisely,
instead of analyzing the Markov process M(a,δ), we can analyze the associated Markov
process M(a/T,δ/T), that we name the T−period subdivision of M(a,δ), with steady
state distribution  T. We show that there exists some T ′ such that, for all T ≥ T ′, the em-
ployment statuses of any path-connected agents are positively correlated under  T. Consider
M(a/T,δ/T). For this Markov process, at every period, every shock (be it a job arrival
a/T or a job breakdown δ/T) is very unlikely when T is high enough. Having two or more
shocks in every such period is thus much less unlikely. Instead of analyzing M(a/T,δ/T),
we analyze an approximated Markov process M∗ (a/T,δ/T) where we only keep track of
one-shock transitions, and disregard transitions involving two or more shocks. We denote
by  ∗T the corresponding steady-state distribution. The higher T, the closer are the transi-
tions of the approximated Markov process M∗ (a/T,δ/T) to that of the true Markov process
M(a/T,δ/T), and so the closer is  ∗T to  T.
Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004) show that, with a high enough T−period subdivi-
sion, for n individuals and any social network structure, we have:
Proposition 2 Under ﬁne enough subdivisions of periods, the unique steady-state long-run
distribution on employment is such that the employment statuses of any path-connected
agents are positively correlated.
The proposition shows that, despite the short-run conditional negative correlation be-
tween the employment of competitors for jobs and information, in the longer run any in-
terconnected workers’ employment is positively correlated. This implies that there is a
clustering of agents by employment status, and employed workers tend to be connected with
employed workers, and vice versa. The intuition is clear: conditional on knowing that some
set of agents are employed, it is more likely that their neighbors will end up receiving in-
formation about jobs, and so on. The beneﬁts from having other agents in the network
outweigh the local negative correlation eﬀects, if we take a long-run perspective.
Proposition 3 The longer the length of two-path connected individuals (i.e weak ties), the
lower is the correlation in employment statuses between these two individuals.
10Indeed, the correlation between two agents’ employment is (weakly) decreasing in the
number of links that each an agent has, and the correlation between agents’ employment is
higher for direct compared to indirect connections. The decrease as a function of the number
of links is due to the decreased importance of any single link if an agent has many links. The
diﬀerence between direct and indirect connections in terms of correlation is due to the fact
that direct connections provide information, while indirect connections only help by indirect
provision of information that keeps friends, friends of friends, etc., employed. In other words,
the longer the path in the social network between two individuals, the weaker is the eﬀect
of job transmission.
2.5 Interpreting the model in terms of ethnic minorities
The model of Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004) has no ethnic component since it is as-
sumed that all individuals are ex ante identical. It shows, however, that there is a clustering
of workers with the same employment status in equilibrium since, in the long run (i.e. steady
state), employed workers mostly tend to be friends with employed workers. This is because
weak ties (friends of friends of any length) indirectly help individuals by providing job infor-
mation to their strong ties, which, in turn, help them become employed. As a result, in this
framework, if, because of some initial condition, some ethnic minority workers are employed,
then in steady-state they will still be employed because both their strong and weak ties will
also be employed.
To illustrate this issue, let us consider a network with four workers, i.e. n = 4. Figure 2
depicts the value of unemployment probabilities of worker 1, and the correlations between
workers 1 and 2, and between workers 1 and 3, in the long-run steady state for a = 0.10 and
δ = 0.015. These results are calculated using numerical simulations repeated for a suﬃciently
long period of time. When there is no social network so that no information is exchanged
between workers, the unemployment rate of each agent is just equal to its steady-state value,
i.e. δ/(a + δ) = 0.13. Thus, the probability of being unemployed for each worker is 13.2
percent, given that they cannot rely on other workers to obtain information about jobs and
the only chance they can have of obtaining a job is by direct methods. Imagine now that
one link is added in this network so that workers 1 and 2 are directly linked to each other.
Steady-state unemployment decreases substantially for workers 1 and 2, from 13.2 percent to
8.3 percent. When more links are added, the unemployment rate for each worker decreases
even more from 13.2 percent when there are no links to 5 percent when the social network
is complete. This table also shows the positive correlation between employment statuses
of diﬀerent workers already mentioned before. As stated above, this model can provide a
11rationale for why ethnic minorities, who tend to have friends who are of the same ethnicity
(see, for example, Sigelman, 1996; Cutler et al., 1999; McPherson et al., 2001; Jackson,
2008; Currarini et al., 2010), have diﬃculties in ﬁnding a job. Since employment statuses
between direct and indirect friends of the same network are correlated, then, like a disease,
unemployment will spread among all individuals belonging to this network. Similarly, if
ethnic minorities can help each other ﬁnding a job because some of them have been successful
upon their arrival in the host country, then we will ﬁnd a positive correlation between the
size of the network friends and the individual probability of ﬁnding a job, as in Proposition
1.
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Figure 2: Employment correlations as a function of network structure
In the Calvó-Armengol and Jackson framework, there are no general-equilibrium eﬀects.
Indeed, in the model, a, the arrival rate of jobs to each individual (excluding referrals), is
considered constant and exogenous. Consider, however, the existence of a (more-or-less) ﬁxed
pool of jobs available to low-skilled individuals in immigrant communities. Here, employees
have an incentive to pass on information to members of one’s own network, but not to
individuals of the other networks. Job-oﬀer arrivals could thus be completely endogenous to
12the networks. In this context, individuals embedded in larger networks are more likely to
capture jobs initially. This increases the fraction of employed individuals in the “networked”
group and reduces the availability of jobs to the group of individuals who do not have access
to networks (by reducing the ex ante arrival rate of oﬀers). In an extreme case, all jobs go
to “networked” individuals and immigrants in the unconnected group may never have the
chance to hear from new jobs.
There is another (unmodelled) advantage of having a larger network. Strong and weak
ties provide some sort of insurance. Indeed, even if a worker does have a job now, the network
is valuable as an insurance device that decreases the probability of remaining unemployed in
the case this worker had a negative shock to her current status. Risk-averse individuals will
certainly value this. In developing countries, which often have no formal institution to make
insurance mechanisms operational, it has been widely documented that households use social
networks as an informal insurance (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003). Interestingly, using survey
data from the rural Philippines, Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) show that occupation is not a
major determinant of risk-sharing links. In contrast, geographic proximity is strongly related
to risk-sharing networks. This may be because it facilitates monitoring and enforcement.
As a result, larger networks may increase the employment prospects of workers belonging
to the same network because the network may serve as an insurance device for exogenous
variations of the job-destruction rate δ over time.
3 Bridging the model to the empirics
Let us summarize our theoretical results. We have shown that:
(i) The individual probability of ﬁnding a job is increasing in the number of strong ties
each individual has (Proposition 1);
(ii) The individual probability of ﬁnding a job is increasing in the number of weak ties
each individual has (Proposition 2);
(iii) The longer the length of weak ties, the lower the individual probability of ﬁnding a job
(Proposition 3).
Let us now approximate the social proximity by the geographical proximity, drawing a
link between the social and geographical spaces. We believe that this approximation makes
sense because the two spaces (social and geographic) are highly correlated. For example,
individuals in established immigrant communities typically provide information, seed capital,
13shelter, and legal sponsorship to other immigrants from the same origin communities (family
or friends). In this way, not only employment outcomes but also geographic origin is shared
by immigrants in the same national group living in proximity (e.g. Mexicans froma particular
town in rural Michoacan may tend to live in the same neighborhood in East Los Angeles).
This is the idea of ethnic enclaves that have positive (employment) eﬀects on the local
ethnic community. Ethnic minorities living with large numbers of employed neighbors of
the same ethnicity are more likely to have jobs than ethnic minorities residing in areas with
fewer employed neighbors. This latter ﬁnding is consistent with earlier ﬁndings on Swedish
(Edin et al., 2003), Danish (Damm, 2009) and U.S. immigration (Andersson et al., 2009)
and draws at least partially on the notion that enclaves enable immigrants to form social
networks that eﬀectively make them act as intermediaries in getting jobs. Recently, Bayer
et al. (2008) have shown how the social and the geographical space are highly correlated.
Speciﬁcally, they examine the propensity of a pair of individuals to work in the same location,
comparing such propensities for pairs of individuals who reside on the same versus nearby
blocks. They take the propensity to work in the same location as an indication that one
member of the pair provided a referral (or more generally information) to the other member
about jobs available in her place of work. Their results indicate the existence of signiﬁcant
social interactions at the block level; residing on the same versus nearby blocks increases
the probability of working together by over 33 percent. As a consequence, individuals are
about 6.9 percentage points more likely to work with at least one person from their block
of residence than they would be in the absence of referrals. Beside the speciﬁc studies
on the labor market outcomes of ethnic minorities and ethnic networks (such as the ones
cited in the Introduction), there is a rich socio-economic literature on patterns of relations
among individuals, documenting that social networks appear to be fairly homogeneous with
regard to certain socio-demographic attributes. Indeed, individuals are likely to associate
with people who are similar, i.e., assortative matching or homophily. This tendency is
particularly strong among ethnic groups.6,7 Therefore, because of all these arguments, we
believe that it is reasonable to assume that the density of individuals of a given ethnic group is
a good approximation for the social contacts that each individual of that ethnicity is exposed
to. Looking at the importance of social networks for the acquisition and transmission of
information about jobs, a more precise measure of the relevant social contacts is the density
6See e.g. Moody (2001), Marmaros and Sacerdote (2006), Bayer et al. (2007).
7It has also been shown that investments in public goods, tastes for redistribution, and other forms of civic
behavior are more common in racially or ethnically homogenous communities (see Alesina and La Ferrara ,
2005, for an overview of this literature).
14of employed workers having the same ethnicity living nearby.
Take an individual with a given set of characteristics (family, age, education, gender...),
living in area a and belonging to race r. Our conjecture is that the density of employed
people living in the same area is a good approximation of the number of direct friends one
has, i.e. strong ties, especially if the areas are not too large and if people belong to the
same ethnic group (Topa, 2001). In the same spirit, the density of employed individuals
living in neighboring areas will be a measure of friends of friends, i.e. weak ties. Using this
approach, other things being equal (i.e. ﬁxing the characteristics of the area) the theoretical
predictions are as follows.
(i) The higher is the percentage of type−r employed workers living in area a, the higher
is the individual probability of ﬁnding a job for an individual of type−r living in area
a (Proposition 1).
(ii) The higher is the percentage of type−r employed workers living in the neighboring
areas of a, the higher is the individual probability of ﬁnding a job for an individual of
type−r living in area a (Proposition 2).
(iii) This eﬀect should decrease with the distance between area a and its neighboring areas
(Proposition 3).
4 Data
Our data source is the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS). This survey was conducted every two
years from 1975-1983, then annually until 1992 and quarterly since that date. In the present
study, we use the Quarterly Labour Force Survey from 1992 until 2009.8 It is an address-
based household survey (including about 60,000 households), which allows us to get rich
individual-level information at a local level, i.e. the local authority, as well as information
on ethnicity at a level of disaggregation suitable for our purposes. The local authority is
the ﬁner level of spatial disaggregation of the English local government structure.9 For the
purposes of our analysis, ethnicity has to be deﬁned in a narrow way. For example, the
8The data are available through the Oﬃce of National Statistics (ONS). We acknowledge the original
data creators, depositors or copyright holders, the funders of the Data Collections and the UK Data Archive.
They bear no responsibility for their further analysis or interpretation.
9In England, there is indeed a mix of single-tier and two-tier local government. Our deﬁnition of “local
authority” considers single-tier (unitary) authorities together with the lower-tier authorities in areas of two-
tier local government. For example, in London there are 33 local authorities (London boroughs).
15density of Asian people living nearby cannot be a good approximation of the social contacts
of a Black-Caribbean person. This is due to important cultural (and language) diﬀerences
between these groups. Therefore, in order to ensure a relative cultural homogeneity within
each ethnic group, our investigation has been performed separately for the diﬀerent ethnic
minorities that can be unambiguously identiﬁed in our data, namely “Black Caribbean”,
“Black African”, “Indian”, “Pakistani”, “Bangladeshi” and “Chinese”.10 Ethnic minorities,
however, are not over-sampled in the survey design. Because of the resulting small sample
sizes per local areas of each speciﬁc ethnic minority group in each quarter, we pool individuals
for the diﬀerent quarters across years.
Excluding local areas with too low sample sizes of ethnic minorities (or too low sample
sizes in adjacent areas), we are left with a ﬁnal sample of 15,008 ethnic minority individuals
who are employed distributed over 49 local authorities in the UK. These areas are located
in London, in the West Midlands, in Yorkshire and in Merseyside.11,12 We report in Table 1
some summary statistics. Indians are the largest group representing slightly more than 2%
of the total population, followed by Pakistanis (1.4%), Black African and Black Caribbeans
(1%), Chinese and Bangladeshis (0.5%). Pakistani and Bangladeshi are the groups that seem
to face more diﬃculties in ﬁnding a job.13 Chineses show the highest self-employment rate.
[Insert Table 1 here]
In our empirical analysis, we deﬁne as employed each individual in paid work, including
self-employed and those under government schemes.14,15 The density of own-race employed
individuals leaving nearby is the ratio between employed individuals and resident individuals
in the work-force (years 16-64) for each race in each local authority.
10We exclude mixed-ethnicity individuals. The ethnicity question has been re-deﬁned during the years
and these mixed categories were the groups mostly aﬀected by these changes.
11Ethnic minorities are mainly concentrated in London (slightly less than a half), in the West Midlands,
in Yorkshire and Humberside and in the North West and Merseyside (Cabinet Oﬃce, 2003). In contrast,
only about a tenth of all White people live in London, and about 4 per cent in the West Midlands.
12Not all the areas contain large enough sample sizes of all ethnic groups.
13The particularly low employment rate of Pakistani and Bangladeshi is partly due to the extremely low
employement rate of female (about 20% in both groups). The ﬁgures reported in Table 1 are consistent with
other studies on the labor market performance of ethnic minorities in the UK (see e.g. Dustmann et al.,
2003). We restric here our sample to the total population aged 16-64.
14It does not include unpaid family workers.
15Because our analysis requires a high level of disaggregation by ethnic groups and by geographical areas,
we cannot further disaggregate our data by sex, type of employment, sector or education level because of
small sample sizes of each cell in each area.
16We measure distance between areas by the average road journey time (in minutes) be-
tween the centres of the areas.16 Indeed, driving times is a relative good representation of
how agents’ contacts develop and is better than other measures of proximity, such as physical
distance or contiguity (see, e.g. Conley and Topa, 2002). The estimated road journey time
between areas in the sample varies between 9.7 minutes and 514 minutes, with a median
journey time of approximately 198 minutes. This spatial approach is essential to implement
the test of our point (iii) above. Let us be more precise. In the original Calvó-Armengol
and Jackson (2004) model the length of ties is measured by the path connecting individuals
(see deﬁnitions 1 and 2). Since we approximate the social space by the physical space, to
measure ties of diﬀerent lengths we create proximity bands based on driving time between
areas and we measure the population density by ethnic group within each proximity band.
To be speciﬁc, for each local authority l in our sample, we create new variables containing
the densities of ethnic population within 20 minutes driving time from local authority l;
within 20-40 minutes, and so on. We assume that the population of each local authority
is concentrated at the economic centre of the local authority, so that each time band (e.g.,
20-40 minutes) contains the population densities of all areas whose centre is in the band (e.g.,
within 20-40 minutes from the centre of local authority l).17 By comparing estimates across
rings, it is possible to assess the impact of the density of own-race employed individuals
living nearby and how far this eﬀect extends.
The target variable in our theoretical framework is the probability of ﬁnding a job through
social network contacts. In the LFS, the recently employed workers (i.e. those who are in
their current job for no more than three months before 2005 and twelve months after 2005)
were asked which job search method was used to obtain their current job, among the following
list of possibilities: “reply to a job advertisement”, “Jobcentre or jobmarket”, “private
employment agencies”, “hearing from someone who worked there”, “direct applications”,
“some other way”. Table 2 shows that more than 20% of ethnic minority individuals found
a job from hearing from someone who worked there. For Bangladeshi, almost 50% of the
jobs are found through this method. Although there is no evidence that ethnic minorities
necessarily beneﬁt from this method more than whites (the percentage here is slightly less
16Distances in travel times and kilometers are estimated using Microsoft Autoroute 2002. The Microsoft
Autoroute software computes the driving time between two locations on the basis of the most eﬃcient route
given the road network in 2002, and allowing for diﬀerent average speeds of travel depending on the type of
road.
17The analysis has also been performed assuming that the population is evenly distributed within the area
(see, Rosenthal and Strange, 2008 and Rice and al., 2006, for details on this approach). The results remain
qualitatively unchanged.
17than 30%), the information about jobs provided by social contacts is a non-negligible factor
for the labor market prospects of ethnic minorities.
In order to help establish the representativeness of our sample, it is important to compare
these ﬁgures with the UK-wide pattern of job ﬁnding methods. In their tables 1 and 2, Battu
et al. (2011) investigate similar issues using the same data sources (Labour Force Survey) for
the UK. Although they refer to a slightly diﬀerent period (1998-2001) and include only males,
the data are for all the UK and not only for some areas (like in our study). They ﬁnd very
similar shares. Observe that, contrarily to Battu et al. (2011) who investigate the immigrant
characteristics that associate with the type of job search method, we do not focus here on
this aspect. Immigrant characteristics (sex, age, marital status, time since arrival in the UK,
etc...) are used as controls in our analysis, i.e. we look at the relationship between ethnic
population density and the probability of ﬁnding a job through social networks (relative to
other search methods) given the immigrant characteristics.
[Insert Table 2 here]
5 Empirical strategy and estimation results
5.1 Empirical strategy
Our aim is to study whether and to what extent network size positively impacts on the
individual probability of ﬁnding a job through social contacts for ethnic minorities as well
as to uncover diﬀerences between ethnic groups. As mentioned above, we use the density of
own-ethnic employed workers living nearby as a proxy for the size of each individual social
network. This choice is motivated by the lack of data on the precise contacts each individual
has. This can be a viable alternative but it comes at a cost. The assessment of the existence
of a causal eﬀect of local ethnic employment rate on individual labor market outcomes is a
diﬃcult empirical exercise. The main problem is the possible presence of unobservable area
characteristics that can be responsible for an endogenous sorting of individuals into areas.
For example, if the more able ethnic minority workers manage to live in more dynamic
labor markets, with higher employment rates, and if these individuals are also the ones who
beneﬁt the most from job information provided by friends, then our estimates will be upward
biased. In this paper, we address these concerns in two ways. First, we include area ﬁxed
eﬀects. Our spatial unit of analysis is the local authority and we use ﬁxed eﬀects at the
level of NUTS3 area, which are wider areas but far smaller that a region. By doing so, a
18large number of unobserved diﬀerences between areas are controlled for. Second, we use an
instrumental variable strategy. We instrument the contemporaneous local authority ethnic
employment density by its value lagged in time, as reported in the 1991 Census. As labor
market conditions evolve over time, our assumption is that the factors that inﬂuenced the
pattern of settlement of ethnic minorities in the past are unrelated with employment prospect
today (and job search method eﬃcacy), apart from their eﬀect through the present-day ethnic
density variable. Such a strategy has been extensively used in the literature. In fact, most of
the literature uses the existence of immigrant communities and the assumption that the size
of existing ethnic networks matter to generate instruments about the location of immigrants
(see, for instance, Walker and Hannan, 1989; Altonji and Card, 1991; Massey and Zenteno,
1999; and Card, 2001).
Another issue is that high (low) employment rate areas are usually surrounded by high
(low) employment rate areas. Traditional studies on the relationship between local employ-
ment rates and individual labor-market outcomes ignore possible spillover eﬀects at the local
level, i.e. the eﬀect of the levels of the variables in neighboring areas. In this paper, we ex-
plicitly look at this issue. We take into account the geographical location of the areas and
use spatial data analysis techniques to appreciate the range of action of the eﬀects. Impor-
tantly, by creating ethnic employment density proximity bands, we deﬁne the relevant local
community aﬀecting individual employment prospects in a ﬂexible way.
There are, of course, other possible identiﬁcation strategies to tackle the issue of endoge-
nous sorting of individuals into areas. Scandinavian studies have used natural experiments
through placement policies that randomly allocate immigrants to locations (see Edin et al.,
2003, or Åslund et al., 2010, for Sweden and Damm, 2009, for Denmark). Others have used
very detailed data on location and jobs. For example, Bayer et al. (2008) take advantage
of the use of data from the US Census, disaggregated at the level of the city block. City
blocks are then grouped into small sets of adjacent areas and they then condition on block
group ﬁxed eﬀects in their regression analysis to isolate block-level variation in neighbor at-
tributes. Their identifying assumption is the absence of correlation in unobservables across
blocks within block groups. Boeri et al. (2011) adopt an IV strategy based on the use of the
physical characteristics of the buildings in diﬀerent Italian urban structures. Others have
used a more structural approach,18 like e.g. Dennis Epple and his co-authors (see, in par-
ticular, Epple and Sieg, 1999; Epple et al., 2001; Epple et al., 2009). Their approach seeks
to explain how members of a given total population, deﬁned in terms of the distribution
of individuals’ demographic characteristics, allocate themselves via the housing market to
18For an overview on this approach, see Ioannides (2012, Chap. 3).
19distinct communities. In particular, Epple et al. (2009) develop a model for the market of
public housing that captures excess demand for public housing and rationing in equilibrium.
They characterize the equilibrium and show that a unique equilibrium exists if the housing
authority follows an equal treatment policy and does not discriminate based on current res-
idence. They then develop a maximum likelihood estimator and estimate the parameters
of the model based on a unique restricted use panel data set of low-income households in
Pittsburgh.
As stated above, our strategy is diﬀerent because we have neither a natural experiment
nor data with such level of geographical detail and we do not use a completely structural
approach. Instead, we condition on NUTS3 ﬁxed eﬀects (larger areas) and then investigate
the spatial scale of the eﬀects within each area using data at a lower (the lowest available)
level of spatial disaggregation, which is the local authority level.
5.2 Empirical model and estimation results

















i,l denotes the probability of ﬁnding a job through social contacts for individual i
of type r in local authority l, Xr
i,l is a set of control variables both at the individual i and
local area l level that are likely to inﬂuence employment prospects of ethnic group r, and
dr
σ,l denotes the employment rate of ethnic group r in local authority l within the proximity
bands σ. The error term is composed of an area-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect, ηc and a white noise
error component, εr
i,a.
Table 3 collects the descriptive statistics for our set of control variables, for each ethnic
group separately and for whites.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Table 4 reports the probit results from the estimation of (2) with four proximity bands:
up to 20 min, 20 to 40 min, 40 to 60 min, 60 to 80, min, and our set of control variables, for
each ethnic group in a separate panel. Looking at the table, the local employment density
19W stands for “White”, BC for “Black Caribbean”, BA for “Black African”, I for “Indian”, P for
“Pakistani”, B for “Bangladeshi” and C for “Chinese”.
20shows a positive eﬀect on the probability of ﬁnding a job through social contacts, which is
the greatest within 20 minutes driving time. This eﬀect then decreases quite sharply with
travel time and there is impact beyond approximately 60 minutes. This pattern remains
unchanged across the diﬀerent ethnic minority groups. If the ethnic employed population
density is taken as a measure of the strength of social contacts, these results are consistent
with our theoretical mechanisms. Indeed, the theoretical mechanism postulates that such
contagion/spillover eﬀects can be explained by the diﬀusion of information between adjacent
areas. This means that strong ties (i.e. employed population density of the same ethnic
group within 20 minutes driving time) have a greater positive impact on the probability of
ﬁnding a job through friends than weak ties of length 2 (i.e. employed population density of
the same ethnic group within 20 to 40 minutes driving time), which, in turn, has a higher
impact than weak ties of length 3 (i.e. employed population density of the same ethnic group
within 40 to 60 minutes driving time), etc.
The results show, however, important diﬀerences between ethnic groups both in terms of
magnitude and statistical signiﬁcance of the eﬀects. For two of the Asian groups, Indian and
Pakistani, the eﬀects are not statistically signiﬁcant. Instead, the four other groups display
high and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects. Interestingly, the eﬀects are higher for the Chinese
and the Bangladeshi groups than for the Black Caribbeans and Black Africans, conﬁrming
the idea that Chinese and Pakistani form close-knit networks. Focusing on the estimates
of the spatial decay, Bangladeshis and Chineses also show higher rates of attenuation. In
particular, the eﬀects are quite localized for the Chineses since a one point percentage increase
in the density of the Chinese employed population within 20 minutes driving time increases
the Chinese probability of ﬁnding a job through social contacts by roughly 0.13 percentage
points. This is more than twice the impact of the density of the Chinese employed population
living 40 minutes away, and almost 6 times that of the density of the Chinese employed
population living at 60 minutes.
The last panel of Table 4 shows the results that are obtained when the analysis is run
on the white sample. The eﬀect are extremely small in magnitude and statistical signiﬁcant
only for distances within 20 minutes (signiﬁcant at only 10%). This conﬁrms our idea that
networks approximated by local population density mainly work for ethnic minorities but
not for whites. In light of the model, this means that social networks are particularly strong
and localized for the Chinese and Pakistani ethnic minorities. It does not mean, however,
that whites do not use social networks for ﬁnding a job. It just means that the density of
similar workers is not a good approximation for the social networks of white workers.
21[Insert Table 4 here]
As mentioned before, a major concern of our empirical analysis can be described as
follows. If local authorities that attract ethnic workers also have exogenously determined
characteristics (not directly observables) that aﬀect employment and the success of job search
methods, then the employed population density variables might be correlated with the error
term. In that case, instead of social networks, we may capture some unobserved character-
istics of workers if, for example, the higher the (unobserved) ability of ethnic minorities, the
more likely they live in areas with high employment rates and ﬁnd a job through friends and
relatives. Such a mechanism would lead to an overestimation in a standard OLS regression.
We address this problem by using an instrumental variable approach. We instrument the
contemporaneous level of ethnic employment population density by its value lagged in time.
For each area (and each band) and each ethnic group, we take the corresponding popula-
tion density reported in the 1991 Census. As labor market conditions evolve over time, our
assumption is that the factors that inﬂuenced the pattern of settlement of ethnic minorities
in the past are unrelated with employment prospect (and job search method eﬃcacy) today,
apart from their eﬀect through the present-day ethnic population variable.20
Table 5 has the same structure as Table 4 and contains our IV results. Although the
estimated eﬀects are slightly lower in magnitude and less precisely estimated, the results
conﬁrm the main ﬁndings of Table 4.
Observe that our approach is likely to identify a Local Average Treatment Eﬀect or
LATE (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). Speciﬁcally, our estimates are identiﬁed by the subgroup
of the ethnic population whose residential decision is aﬀected by the presence of ethnic
network ties. Those are the individuals who have weaker ties to the native population and
are more likely to require assistance from the ethnic network. Therefore, this is the group
that probably self-select the most to live in large immigrant ghettos in order to beneﬁt from
same-ethnicity networks. Note that this may actually be the LATE of policy interest for
populations with fragile or uncertain attachment to the native labor markets. Intuitively,
an ethnic minority individual who has completely assimilated to the white’s norm and has
a very extensive network of friends and professional contacts in the native population is
almost observationally equivalent to a native, and we may not be very concerned about her
outcomes in terms of policy any longer.
20The analysis has also been performed by excluding individuals surveyed in 1992 in order to ensure the
instrument exogeneity. The results remain qualitatively unchanged.
22[Insert Table 5 here]
6 Additional results
In this section, we investigate further our ﬁndings. As noted before, the small sample sizes
of each ethnic group individuals in each area (local authority) prevent us to perform our
analysis by type of employment, occupation or industrial sector. In other words, we cannot
provide concluding results about the nature of the relationship between ethnic population
density and employment prospect. For example, it can be driven by agglomeration of co-
ethnic workers in speciﬁc activities or in self-employment. We cannot look at those issues
here. However, we can perform two further exercises. Firstly, we can investigate if the
eﬀect of ethnic networks varies with the time since arrival in UK. In Tables 4 and 5 we
used this information as a control. However, one might think that ethnic networks are much
more important for recently-arrived immigrants, because they rely exclusively on family
and friends in the same community to obtain information about jobs. As they stay longer
in the country, immigrants develop broader networks including natives and individuals in
other national groups. Table 6 shows the results of our analysis when considering only the
subsample of individuals in the bottom quartile in terms of years since arrival in the UK.21
We ﬁnd that the our results are stronger for more recently arrived immigrants. In line with
the expectations, this evidence points to the fact that more recently-arrived immigrants tend
to rely more on local ethnic networks for ﬁnding a job.
Interestingly, using data on political refugees resettled in the U.S., Beaman (2012) shows
that the relationship between social network size and labor market outcomes is heterogeneous
and depends on the vintage of network members: an increase in network size can negatively
impact some cohorts in a network while beneﬁting others. Her empirical results indicate
that an increase in the number of social network members resettled in the same year or one
year prior to a new arrival leads to a deterioration of outcomes, while a greater number of
tenured network members improves the probability of employment.
[Insert Table 6 here]
Our second exercise, instead, looks at the diﬀerences between formal and informal meth-
ods of job ﬁndings. It is indeed interesting to know whether the importance and spatial
21In Table 6 and 7 we report the IVs results. OLS results are similar and remain available upon request.
23attenuation of the eﬀects of ethnic networks on the probability of ﬁnding a job diﬀers be-
tween jobs found through formal or informal methods. Table 7 shows the results of our
analysis when considering jobs obtained using the methods “replay to a job advertisement”
and “direct applications” (grouped together). We can see that most of our results lose statis-
tical signiﬁcance. The eﬀect of the ethnic network remains important only for the Chineses.
Furthermore, the eﬀect is spatially much less far reaching since it is virtually 0 after 20
minutes travel time. Indeed, the probability of ﬁnding a job through formal methods does
not seem to be aﬀected by the density of the ethnic population living nearby. These ﬁndings
support our theoretical model based on ethnic networks as a channel of information sharing.
[Insert Table 7 here]
7 Concluding remarks
Using individual-level data from the UK Labour Force Survey, we look at the employment
prospects of ethnic minorities by adding to the traditional determinants of employment rates
(sex, age, education, years since arrival in UK, percentage of high-skilled leaving nearby,
etc...) local ethnic employment density bands based on travel-time between areas. Such a
speciﬁcation allow us to deﬁne the relevant local community in a ﬂexible way. Using sub-
regional area-ﬁxed eﬀects and an IV approach, we ﬁnd that the higher is the percentage
of employed workers from a given ethnic group living nearby, the higher is the probability
of ﬁnding a job through social networks. This eﬀect decays, however, very rapidly with
distance, losing signiﬁcance beyond approximately an hour travel time. We argue that local
social interactions between people of the same ethnicity can explain this positive relationship
and its spatial trend. Conjecturing that the social space is highly correlated to the physical
space for ethnic minorities in relatively small areas, we present a theoretical framework
based on Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004), which shows that the individual probability
of ﬁnding a job increases with the number of strong ties and weak ties, and the longer the
length of weak ties, the lower is this probability. Our data are, however, limited for delivering
conclusive results about the mechanisms at the basis of the complex relationship between
employment and ethnicity. Our purpose here is to highlight that peer eﬀects might be an
important part of the story. If ethnic employment density is interpreted as a proxy for the
strength of social contacts in delivering information about jobs, then our analysis suggests
that they are quite localized and are relevant in explaining the spatial distribution of ethnic
employment.
24Our results are consistent with the view that ethnic minorities’ success or failure in
the labor market is inﬂuenced by the characteristics of the social networks in their local
neighborhoods. Ethnic minorities living with large numbers of employed neighbors of the
same ethnicity are more likely to have jobs than ethnic minorities residing in areas with
fewer employed neighbors. This latter ﬁnding is consistent with earlier ﬁndings on Swedish
(Edin et al., 2003), Danish (Damm, 2009) and U.S. immigration (Andersson et al., 2009)
and draws at least partially on the notion that enclaves enable immigrants to form social
networks that eﬀectively make them act as intermediaries in getting jobs.
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31Table 1: Sample description 




Indian  Pakistani  Bangladeshi  Chinese  Total 
               
In total population  1.10  1.01  2.15  1.41  0.55  0.53  6.75 
               
In total ethnic population  16.30  14.96  31.85  20.89  8.15  7.85  100 
of which               
Employed  54  60  61  32  33  47   
Self-employed  4  6  2  9  5  11   
               
Notes. All Figures are percentages. For British, the percentages of employed and self-employed are 65 and 9 respectively 
 
Table 2: Method used to find a job 




Indian  Pakistani  Bangladeshi  Chinese  British 
               
Reply to a job advertisement  32  30  25  29  17  12  29 
Jobcentre, jobmarket  10  7  10  7  8  12  7 
Private employment agencies  16  8  15  4  8  15  8 
Hearing from someone who worked there  20  27  21  22  46  23  27 
Direct applications  17  14  17  32  13  27  18 
Some other ways  5  8  12  6  8  11  11 
               
N. Obs.  2446  2246  4780  3135  1223  1178  222,384 
               
Notes. All Figures are percentages, except those in the last row. 
   Table 3: Descriptive statistics 




Indian  Pakistani  Bangladeshi  Chinese  British 
 














































































































Notes. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) are reported. “Education qualification high” is a dummy taking value 1 if the respondent has A-
level or above qualification. “Proportion of high-skilled population” is the percentage of people having A-level or above qualification in the local authority.  Table 4:  Probability of Finding a Job Using Social Networks 




Indian  Pakistani  Bangladeshi  Chinese  British 
Own ethnic group employment density               
























































               




























































































































NUTS3 area fixed effects  yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Notes. Probit estimation results. Marginal effects at the sample means and clustered standard errors (in parentheses) are reported; time dummies are 
included;  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Table 5:  Probability of Finding a Job Using Social Networks - IV estimates - 




Indian  Pakistani  Bangladeshi  Chinese  British 
Own ethnic group employment density               
























































               




























































































































NUTS3 area fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Notes. Probit estimation results. Marginal effects at the sample means and clustered standard errors (in parentheses) are reported; time dummies are 
included;  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Table 6:  Probability of Finding a Job Using Social Networks - IV estimates – 
-More recently arrived immigrants- 




Indian  Pakistani  Bangladeshi  Chinese 
Own ethnic group employment density             
















































             




















































































NUTS3 area fixed effects  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Notes. Probit estimation results. Marginal effects at the sample means and clustered standard errors (in parentheses) are reported; time dummies are 
included;  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 Table 7:  Probability of Finding a Job Using More Formal Methods - IV estimates - 




Indian  Pakistani  Bangladeshi  Chinese  British 
Own ethnic group employment density               
























































               




























































































































NUTS3 area fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Notes. Probit estimation results. Marginal effects at the sample means and clustered standard errors (in parentheses) are reported; time dummies are 
included;  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Formal methods include “private employment agencies” and “direct 
applications”. 